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INTRODUCTION
A developer seeks to build low-income housing in a middle-class
suburb. She complies with the local zoning ordinance and all the
permit regulations, but a citizens' group protests because it fears the
subdivision will lower property values. The local government accedes
and uses a pretext to reject the subdivision plan. Consequently, the
developer loses her financing and her shirt. To avoid the expense
and delay of an inverse condemnation suit for a regulatory taking in
state court, she brings instead a substantive due process claim in fed-
eral court. This Comment concerns whether her substantive due pro-
cess claim should lie.
As government's exercise of its police powers has grown over the
last century, so too have those powers' conflicts with private property
rights, particularly land development rights.' Zoning regulations, and
later environmental regulations, became important legal weapons
used by government to influence or limit private land development.
Initially, developers lacked potent constitutional protections
While this Comment primarily focuses upon land development rights, many of
the concepts are equally applicable to other property rights. But see infra Part 1V.E
(discussing the distinction between specific property interests and rights in all one's
property that was made in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfe4 524 U.S. 498, 524-37 (1998)).
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against such regulation. Traditional takings doctrine only protected
against physical occupations of land; it did not apply to land use regu-
lation. Later, landowners used two new doctrinal weapons-substan-
tive due process and regulatory takings-to defend private property
rights against government control.
In every other economic context, substantive due process and the
legacy of Lochner v. New York2 has been discredited and extirpated.
3
Thus it is strange that, until recently, federal courts have allowed eco-
nomic substantive due process-an endangered species of constitu-
tional doctrine-to escape extinction (and in some instances even to
flourish) within the ecosystem that is land development law.
4 Moreo-
ver, substantive due process survives despite its protections having
been incorporated into regulatory takings doctrine, which might seem
to vitiate the need for substantive due process. Substantive due proc-
ess lives on largely because it retains one important evolutionary ad-
vantage over the takings doctrine: it provides a quick avenue into
federal court for plaintiffs who would be delayed or discouraged by
the strict ripeness requirements of regulatory takings claims.
While the Supreme Court has avoided this issue time and again,
6
several circuits have applied a concept from constitutional criminal
law, the "Graham doctrine,"7 invalidating substantive due process
2 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3 For example, the Supreme Court said in Ferguson v. Skrupa:
There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike
down laws which were thought unreasonable .... The doctrine that prevailed
in Lochner ... has long since been discarded .... It is now settled that States
"have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in
their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run
afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition. ."
372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Substantive due process does remain an important, albeit controversial, doctrine
in the realm of "fundamental" rights regarding sex and the family. These occasionally
may overlap with private property rights, see, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) (favoring the right of families to live together over the city's
zoning ordinance); however, economic rights generally, and private property rights
specifically, are not themselves "fundamental." Cf Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Funda-
mental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 555-59 (1997) (advocating the creation of fun-
damental property rights).
4 See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49
SYRACUSE L. REv. 917,927-36 (1999) (citing examples of land use decisions).
5 See infra Part I.B (discussing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), and the
incorporation of a means-ends calculus into takings doctrine).
6 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (citing cases).
7 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (forbidding the use of substan-
tive due process to enforce the explicit protections in the Fourth Amendment against
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claims by land developers challenging zoning and other regulations.
The circuit courts of appeals are split on this issue, s perhaps because it
makes strange bedfellows of conservative supporters of private prop-
erty rights and liberal supporters of unenumerated constitutional
rights.
This Comment argues that the Graham doctrine should forbid
substantive due process claims from supplementing or supplanting
regulatory takings claims by land developer plaintiffs. Part I outlines
substantive due process and regulatory takings. Part II describes the
Supreme Court's Graham doctrine and the split of authority, in which
some circuits apply the Graham doctrine to forbid substantive due
process claims in regulatory takings cases and others do not. Part III
compares three broad aspects of substantive due process claims and
regulatory takings claims: procedural, substantive, and remedial. It
also discusses how the Supreme Court has muddled the historical dif-
ferences between the two claims. Finally, Part IV discusses the reasons
why the Graham doctrine should be used to disallow all substantive
due process claims where a regulatory takings claim is colorable
against government regulation of land development.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF LAND DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
A. Substantive Due Process Claims
Despite the end of the Lochner era early in the last century, sub-
stantive due process claims continue to succeed in land development
cases.9 Such claims are generally brought under § 1983"° for depriva-
tions of property under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, does not protect all puta-
tive property interests, nor all would-be development rights. Vested
rights, those granted irrevocably, warrant protection. 2 Alternatively, a
illegal seizures).
See infra Part II (detailing the circuit split).
0 See infra notes 103-06 (giving examples of cases where substantive due process
claims were and were not successful).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
11 "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1 State law defines vested property rights. Typically, common law estops the gov-
ernment from changing the regulations applied to a developer after she expends sig-
nificant amounts in good faith reliance on the old regulations. However, at least ten
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plaintiff developer must often show she is entitled to the use sought.
3
Under an entitlement test, if government enjoys discretion in regulat-
ing development, a due process challenge will not lie.
4 This is often a
considerable hurdle for a plaintiff to cross.
Assuming a protectible property interest, a few courts
15 and com-
mentators1 6 have distinguished two types of substantive due process
claims. The older are "arbitrary and capricious substantive due proc-
ess" claims ("arbitrary and capricious SDP" claims), which allege irra-
tional or ill-motivated government action. More recently, developers
have asserted "substantive due process takings" claims ("SDP takings"
claims), which are identical to takings claims, but which bypass the
most difficult ripeness requirement of takings claims. It is sometimes
difficult to distinguish between these two subspecies of substantive
due process claims.
1. "Arbitrary and Capricious Substantive Due Process" Claims
Arbitrary and capricious SDP claims allege that government ac-
tions are not rationally related to legitimate objectives. These claims
are descendants of the Lochner era, and they challenge regulation that
is arbitrary or capricious.
states have statutes defining when vesting occurs, which can be as early as an 
initial
subdivision application. See John Bredin, Vesting of Development Rights: A Primer,
ZONING NEwS, July 1999, at 1 (listing statutes).
13 See Thomas E. Roberts et al., Land-Use Litigation: Doctrinal Confusion Under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 28 URB. LAW. 765, 772-75 (1996) (criticizing yet recog-
nizing the widespread use of the entitlement test). Not all circuits apply an entitle-
ment test, however. In the Third Circuit, mere ownership of real property is enough
to invoke due process against land use restrictions. See, e.g., DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting additionally that "one would be
hard-pressed to find a property interest more worthy of substantive due process protec-
tion than ownership"). This makes substantive due process claims much easier for de-
velopers to bring in the Third Circuit.
See Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining the
entitlement test). Read literally, an entitlement test is perhaps too stringent. A plain-
tiff who is genuinely entitled to a property right under state law may enforce her rights
directly under that law, rather than indirectly through substantive due process.
15 See, e.g., Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, Ga., 89 F.3d 1481, 1490
n.16 (l1th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between substantive due process takings claims
and arbitrary and capricious substantive due process claims); Pearson v. City of Grand
Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908
F.2d 716, 721-22 (11th Cir. 1990) (same).
I See, e.g., Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 766 & n.3 (distinguishing between sub-
stantive due process claims and due process takings); David S. Mendel, Note, Determin-
ing Ripeness of Substantive Due Process Claims Brought by Landowners Against Local Govern-
ments, 95 MICH. L. REv. 492, 492-93 n.4 (1996) (same).
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The precise level of substantive protection land developers could
expect from arbitrary and capricious SDP claims has not always been
clear. In 1926, the seminal zoning case of Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co. defined unconstitutional regulation as "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." 7 This "substantial relationship"
test allowed zoning regulation generally, as in Euclid, but sometimes
invalidated individual zoning decisions. 8
Since the 1930s, however, only "fundamental rights" have war-
ranted serious scrutiny under substantive due process.19 Nevertheless,
many courts of appeals continue to allow land developer plaintiffs to
invoke arbitrary and capricious SDP claims. The precise legal stan-
dard varies by circuit. The District of Columbia Circuit merely re-
quires a showing of "grave unfairness. 2 ° More commonly, however,
courts require some variation on arbitrariness and/or capriciousness.2'
17 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
18 See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928) (invalidating
a particular zoning boundary).
19 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (listing cases involving
sex and the family).
20 Tri County Indus., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (citation omitted).
21 See, e.g., Lisa's Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 17 (2d Cir.
1999) ("so outrageously arbitrary as to be a gross abuse of governmental authority" (ci-
tation omitted)); Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d
Cir. 1998) ("arbitrary or capricious"); Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d
1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1998) ("unreasonable, or more to the point, arbitrary"); Bitumi-
nous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, Minn., 126 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997)
("'something more than ... arbitrary [and] capricious"' (quoting Chesterfield Dev.
Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992) (first alteration in
original))); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995)
("so arbitrary and irrational, so unjustified by any circumstance or governmental inter-
est, as to be literally incapable of avoidance by any pre-deprivation procedural protec-
tions or of adequate rectification by any post-deprivation state remedies" (citation
omitted)).
On the margins, however, the standards vary greatly. The Third Circuit has ex-
panded greatly the reach of substantive due process by holding government action that
is actually ""'motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive,"' regardless of whether
there is a conceivable legitimate motive, to be a substantive due process violation. Sa-
meric, 142 F.3d at 590-91 (quoting Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d
685, 692 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945
F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991))). (Perhaps the City of Philadelphia is often accused of
bias, bad faith, or improper motive.) See also, e.g., Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d
116, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the intent of public officials is relevant); De-
Blasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 601-02 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing a sub-
stantive due process claim when a zoning board's decision may have been influenced
by one of its member's son's financial interest).
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Such standards indicate when a regulation fails a minimal means-ends
test; that is, when the regulation is "not rationally related to a legiti-
mate public purpose. 2 2
2. "Substantive Due Process Takings" Claims
An SDP takings claim results when a regulation "goes too far and
destroys the value of [one's] property to such an extent that it
amounts to a taking by eminent domain without 
due process of law."
2
Such a claim relies upon the theory that all takings without just com-
pensation do not just violate the Takings Clause; they are also a depri-
vation of property that necessarily must violate the Due Process
Clause. The elements of such a claim are identical to those of a regu-
latory takings claim, but an SDP takings claim conveniently avoids cer-
tain ripeness requirements needed to bring regulatory takings
claims.2
An SDP takings claim may be difficult to distinguish from an arbi-
trary and capricious SDP claim because both must allege failures of
similar means-ends tests. The arbitrary and capricious SDP test (ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose, often called "ar-
bitrary and capricious") is quite similar to the SDP takings test bor-
rowed from takings doctrine (substantially related to a legitimate
Occasionally, other circuits have recognized a similar standard in substantive due
process cases, see, e.g., Bituminous Materials, 126 F.3d at 1071 ("[T]here may be cases
where land use decisions are so corrupted by the personal motives of local government
officials that due process rights are implicated."), although such claims seem better
addressed under procedural due process.
Rarely, a municipal government that violates state or local law is also considered to
have violated substantive due process rights of a plaintiff. See Roberts et al., supra note
13, at 771-72 (citing cases and noting that such cases "demonstrate the problem of try-
ing to cabin substantive due process once it is opened").
22 WMX Techs., Inc. v. Gasconade County, Mo., 105 F.3d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir.
1997); see also, e.g., Tex. Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095,
1106 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The relevant inquiry for ... substantive due process . . . is
whether there existed a rational basis for the City's [action]."); Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48
F.3d at 827 (relying on authority that allows a substantive due process claim against a
zoning decision to survive only if "the alleged purpose [for the zoning decision] has
'no conceivable rational relationship' to ... the state's traditional police power"); Or-
ange Lake Assocs. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1225 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering
whether "the zoning ordinance in question [bore] anything other than a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate government objective").
23 Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1992).
24 See Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 766 n.3 (noting also that "[t]his claim may be
preferable to some since injunctive relief might be available"); infra Part III.A (describ-
ing procedural differences in challenges to land development regulation, including
ripeness requirements).
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government purpose) .25 Because the arbitrary and capricious SDP test
is more stringent than the SDP takings test," arbitrary and capricious
SDP violations are (substantively) necessarily both takings and SDP
takings.
B. Regulatoy Takings Claims
The Fifth Amendment guarantees, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."27 Its application to
government regulation is a relatively recent aspect of constitutional
jurisprudence, although it is generally considered to date from the
1922 decision of the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."2 Nevertheless, Mahon
was decided in the Lochner era, and the Supreme Court at that time
upheld land use regulation by applying the Fourteenth Amendment,
not the Fifth.!'
Regulatory takings came into their own in 1978 when Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City defined three factors in determining
what was "too far": "the character of the governmental action," "the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations," and "the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant. ' ,30 Later, the Supreme Court identified two per se regu-
latory takings ("physical occupations"3 and the "prohibit[ion of] all
,,3 33economically beneficial use of land 32 ) and clarified exactions , all of
which are beyond the scope of this Comment.
25 See infta Part I.B (exploring the "substantial relationship" test).
26 See infta note 137 and accompanying text (distinguishing the two standards).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added).
29 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) ("The process
applies with particular force to the solution of questions arising under the due process
clause of the Constitution as applied to the exercise of the flexible powers of police,
with which we are here concerned."); Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes, Good Faith,
and Land Use Regulation, [2000] 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,100, 10,106 (not-
ing that Agins has its roots in substantive due process, not takings). But see Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (recharacterizing Euclidas a takings case).
30 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
41 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
33 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987). Exactions involve the government's demand that a landowner
give up something (for example, money or an easement) in order to exercise her
property rights.
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Euclid and other early cases upholding zoning regulations were
based upon Lochneresque heightened scrutiny. It was not until 1980,
in Agins v. City of Tiburon,4 that the Supreme Court took the opportu-
nity to recharacterize its justification for upholding zoning generally.
However, that recharacterization seemed to come out of left field:
3"
rather than change the 1920s substantive due process test, the Court
merely cut the "substantial relationship" language from Euclid
36 and
pasted it into takings jurisprudence. Thus did Euclid and Nectow magi-
cally change from Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
cases into Fifth Amendment takings cases, and thus did a means-ends
test enter into regulatory takings analysis.
The "substantial relationship" language of Agins goes beyond the
mere rational basis review typically given substantive due process
claims for economic harm. In Nollan, Justice Scalia wrote for the
Court:
[O]ur verbal formulations in the takings field have generally been quite
different [from those applied to substantive due process or equal protec-
tion claims]. We have required that the regulation "substantially ad-
vance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved, not that "the
state 'could rationally have decided that the measure adopted might
achieve the State's objective."8
Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to have specified an analysis
that is a form of heightened scrutiny akin to Lochneresque substantive
due process, at least for the means half of the test. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the incorporation of heightened means-ends scrutiny
into takings law has been vilified by scholars .:
' Nevertheless, it re-
34 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
35 Perhaps it only came out of short left field. The Court had signaled this move
two years earlier in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127, stating: "a use restriction on real
property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose."
36 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (forbidding zon-
ing ordinances that are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare").
37 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61 (recharacterizing Nectow explicitly and Euclid by im-
plication); see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 753 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court cited a substantive due process
case when recognizing the theory under the rubric of inverse condemnation.").
38 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 (1987) (citations omitted).
39 See, e.g., Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substantive Due Process and Takings--An In-
tegration, 74 NEB. L. REv. 843, 844 (1995) ("[U]nfortunately the Court has failed to
maintain clear lines of demarcation between the substantive due process and takings
rules and has introduced some unnecessary overlap and confusion in their applica-
tion."); John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process
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mains unclear if, in application, the "substantial relationship" analysis
of regulatory takings actually differs from the "rational basis" test of
40substantive due process.
The Court has invited this criticism by failing to give any theoreti-
cal justification for heightened scrutiny of regulatory takings. Never-
theless, heightened means-ends scrutiny for regulatory takings has
now existed for more than two decades, and it has been reiterated
again and again.41  Like it or not, we must assume that heightened
means-ends scrutiny for takings is here to stay.
C. Other Claims
Other constitutional claims can be made in defense of develop-
42ment rights. They include equal protection claims, procedural due• 43 • 44process claims, First Amendment claims, due process claims under
Clause. A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 696 (1993) ("The result
is a confused body of law containing contradictory principles and standards."); Molly S.
McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legis-
lation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 667 (1996) ("IT]his Court is playing a role similar to that of
the Lochner era Court: It is finding a significant portion of the liberal economic
agenda unconstitutional."); Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 765-67 (discussing "prob-
lems caused by the failure to differentiate Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims from Fifth Amendment takings claims" and calling the situation an "un-
fortunate morass"); Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected Through the
Takings Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 ENvrL. L. 155, 155-56 (1995) ("A more
sophisticated form of Lochnerv. New York is upon us and ... results in the same difficul-
ties presented in the Lochner era."); Glen E. Summers, Comment, Private Property With-
out Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142
U. PA. L. REv. 837, 838 (1993) ("[T]he substantial relation test... [is] out of place in
the field of takings jurisprudence .... ").
These criticisms fall into four categories. First, heightened means-ends scrutiny is
an exceedingly difficult standard to judge. Second, the means-ends analysis has no his-
torical place in takings jurisprudence and is out of character with precedent. Third,
because the remedies allowed by substantive due process and takings are different, so
too should the analyses be different. Finally, the melding of substantive due process
into takings jurisprudence invites the reemergence of Lochner-type judicial scrutiny of
economic regulation.
40 See, e.g., S. County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834,
836 (1st Cir. 1998) (giving lip service to the different standards, but concluding that
the tests are "congruent in this instance").
41 See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721 (using language similar to Agins, 447 U.S. at
260); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (citing the Agins formulation);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (same).
42 See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (illustrating a
homeowner's equal protection claim for an exaction).
43 See, e.g., Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 893
(6th Cir. 1991) (illustrating a procedural due process claim against a zoning decision).
Some challenges to government actions seem to lie as either a procedural or substan-
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• • 46
state constitutions,45 and takings claims under state constitutions.
Such claims exist in harmony with both federal substantive due proc-
ess and federal regulatory takings claims and do not alter the sub-
stance of this Comment.
Fifth Amendment substantive due process claims are also possible
when a developer claims that the federal government unconstitution-
ally regulated land use, but they are much less common. However,
analysis of Fifth Amendment due process claims is no different.47
The incorporation sense of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
411Process Clause, occasionally referred to as "substantive due process,"
should not be confused with the wholly different sense of substantive
due process at issue in this Comment.
49
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE GRHAM DOCTRINE: WHERE CAN
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BE USED TO CHALLENGE LAND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION?
Recall the hypothetical developer from the Introduction whose
subdivision plan complied with the law but was denied by the local
tive due process claim. See, e.g., supra note 21 (discussing the Third Circuit's improper
motivation standard).
44 See, e.g., Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 1983)
(holding that a zoning ordinance aimed at adult bookstores violated the First Amend-
ment).
45 These may be confused with federal constitutional claims. See, e.g., Roberts et
al., supra note 13, at 767-68 (noting the confusion between state and federal due proc-
ess claims in Gerijo, Inc. v. City of Fairfield, 638 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1994)). However,
where due process is treated identically, the question is moot. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926) (concluding that due process rights under
the Federal and Ohio Constitutions are the same).
46 Sometimes, state constitutions provide greater takings protection than the fed-
eral Constitution. See, e.g., Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, Ga. 89 F.3d
1481, 1491 (11 th Cir. 1996) (allowing a takings claim under the Georgia Constitution,
but not under the Fifth Amendment).
47 See Tri County Indus. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(analyzing a Fifth Amendment case under a framework substantially identical to Four-
teenth Amendment cases elsewhere).
48 By itself, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause applies only to the federal gov-
ernment. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 242, 250, 7 Pet. 153, 159 (1833). It is appli-
cable against a state or local government only by virtue of this "incorporation" sense of
Fourteenth Amendment due process. S.D. Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
623 n.1 (1981) (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R., Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 239 (1897)).
49 But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405-06 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (interpreting Chicago RR to be a Lochneresque substantive due process case rather
than state incorporation of the Takings Clause).
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government for a reason unrelated to the merits. On similar facts, the
Third Circuit recently upheld a developer's substantive due process
claim. 5 Four circuits allow such a claim without any relevant restric-S 5 1
tions. In two circuits, arbitrary and capricious SDP claims are al-S• 52
lowed, but SDP takings claims are prohibited. In two additional cir-
cuits, substantive due process claims are possible, but they are subject
to the same strict ripeness requirements as takings claims, which
makes them (as a practical matter) very unlikely.53 Three circuits pro-
hibit substantive due process claims because they are subsumed into
the Takings Clause by virtue of the Graham doctrine.54 Only the Sev-
enth Circuit may reject all such economic substantive due process
claims because they are, like Lochner itself, inherently invalid 55
The Supreme Court has done little to resolve this circuit split; in-
deed, the Court may fairly be characterized as having encouraged it.
56
Since the Lochner era, the Court has sidestepped the issue of whether
substantive due process remains a valid rubric under which land de-
velopment rights may be challenged. 7 Perhaps this omission, along
50 Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2000). Follow-
ing the Third Circuit's decision, the local government quickly settled with the devel-
oper. Telephone Interview with Marshall E. Anders, Attorney, Woodwind Estates, Ltd.
(Sept. 27, 2001).
51 See infra Part II.E (Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits).
52 See infra Part II.C (Fifth and Eleventh Circuits).
5: See infra Part II.D (Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits).
5 See infra Part II.B (First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits); infra Part IL.A (explaining
the Graham doctrine).
55 Infra Part I1.F.
State courts also vary in the extent to which they allow substantive due process
claims to developers. Perhaps the most interesting is the State of Washington, where
substantive due process is alive and well. See, e.g., Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police
Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REv. 495, 511-17 (2000) (explaining the reintro-
duction of substantive due process by Washington courts).
56 See PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriquez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (dismissing a writ of cer-
tiorari previously granted in a substantive due process case brought by developer); Wil-
liamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 185 (1985)
("The Court twice has left this issue undecided. Once again ... [it] must be left for
another day." (citation omitted)); id. at 200 (reaching the same result "whether it is
analyzed as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, or as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment"); Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 39, at 710 ("It is remarkable to observe that
the Supreme Court has never addressed the relationship between the Due Process and
the Takings Clauses squarely in its propertyjurisprudence.").
57 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 120-22 (1978)
(holding that disallowing construction in the airspace above Grand Central Station was
not a taking, but ignoring the substantive due process analysis upon which the New
York Court of Appeals had reached the same conclusion below). But cf Goldblatt v.
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with the incorporation of a substantive due process-like test into tak-
ings law and the universal condemnation of Lochner, are sending us a
message about the Court's intentions. However, none of the circuit
courts of appeals forbade substantive due process claims in land de-
velopment rights cases until they received a big hint from the Su-
preme Court in Graham v. Connor.8
A. The Graham Doctrine
In 1984, Dethorne Graham alleged that the police in Charlotte,
North Carolina, stopped him and beat him up for no good reason.
59
He brought a § 1983 claim against the officers, alleging a violation of
his constitutional rights, but he did not make clear the precise source
of those rights.60 The Supreme Court considered both a Fourth
Amendment seizure claim and a more general Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process claim, but it held that only the more
specific Fourth Amendment claim would lie.6' Within the sphere of
seizures, the Court said that the explicit protections of the Bill of• . 62
Rights set the exclusive standard for what is constitutional.
Graham seemed to apply only narrowly to Fourth Amendment sei-
zure cases, but five years later in Albright v. Oliver, the Court reaffirmed
and appeared to expand the scope of the Graham doctrine.
63 The Al-
bright Court reasoned that where the Bill of Rights was incorporated to
the states, the Framers' judgment constituted the extent of constitu-
tional protection, not the more general provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 "Where a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of
government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of "substantive due process," must be the guide for analyzing
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 597 (1962) (contemplating a plaintiff's takings
and due process claims, but deciding only the takings claim).
58 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
59 Id. at 388.
60 Id. at 390.
61 Id. at 395.
62 See id. at 394 ("The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the
specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than to some general-
ized ... standard."); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1986) (applying
standards of the Eighth Amendment and passing over any general Fourteenth
Amendment claim because the latter provides no greater protection).
63 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion, with six Justices
concurring in relevant part).
64 Id.
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these claims."' 5 This language appears open ended, but Albright as a
whole deals only with protections for criminal defendants in the Bill
of Rights.
66
The Supreme Court continues to leave open the question of a
wider application of the Graham doctrine. As the Court recently
noted:
[The Graham doctrine] does not hold that all constitutional claims relat-
ing to physically abusive government conduct must arise under either
the Fourth or Eighth Amendments; rather, Graham simply requires that
if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision,
such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed
under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the
67
rubric of substantive due process.
This vague language hints at the application of Graham to invali-
date substantive due process claims in civil suits regarding other as-
pects of the Bill of Rights. Some courts have taken this hint in other
contexts,' 8 but land development cases are the bloodiest battleground
in the war over the Graham doctrine.
B. Armendariz and the Circuits Applying the Graham Doctrine to
Takings Claims
The Ninth Circuit is the leader in applying the Graham doctrine to
takings cases. It first did so in a case brought by Thomas Armendariz
and other owners of low-income housing in the Arden-Guthrie section
San Bernardino, California, in 1991. 69  They alleged that the city
wanted to evict troublesome tenants in the neighborhood and to clear
the area for a shopping center.76 To accomplish this, the city swept
through the neighborhood citing landlords with seemingly minor
building code violations and forcing tenants to move out until the vio-
lations were fixed. Moreover, the city refused to issue permits for the
65 Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).
66 Id. at 274-75. Although the Supreme Court refused to apply Graham to a civil
case one year earlier, Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1992), that case
dealt with forbidding a Fourth Amendment claim because a substantive due process
claim was possible, exactly the inverse of the holding in Graham.
67 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997).
68 See, e.g., Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1535 n.8 (10th Cir. 1995) (First
Amendment); Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 612 N.W.2d 59, 77 (Wis. 2000) (equal pro-
tection).
69 See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1313-15 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(stating the facts alleged).
70 Id.
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repairs, so property owners were either forced out of business for lack
of rental income or for exceeding a 180-day vacancy time limit (after
which the owners' grandfathered rental use would violate a new zon-
ing ordinance).71 Armendariz brought suit claiming substantive due
process violations.
The en banc decision in Armendariz reversed Ninth Circuit prece-
dent 7 and applied the Graham doctrine to the Takings Clause; hence,
Armendariz's substantive due process claim was barred.73 The court
also concluded that, if Armendariz's allegations were true, they would
constitute a private taking that was prohibited by the Takings 
Clause.74
Nevertheless, the opinion makes clear that a takings claim need not
be successful to preempt a substantive due process claim.3 Instead,
Armendariz merely seeks to prevent substantive due process from "ex-
pand [ing] the constitutional protections afforded by the Bill of Rights
in those areas specifically addressed by the first eight amendments.
Thus, Graham makes clear that the scope of substantive due process,
however ill-defined, does not extend to circumstances already ad-
dressed by other constitutional provisions.7 6
The Ninth Circuit does not distinguish between arbitrary and ca-
pricious SDP claims and SDP takings claims. Indeed, it has applied
Graham consistently to all economic substantive due process 
claims.77
Armendariz applies to both SDP takings claims and arbitrary and capri-
cious SDP claims. Thus, by starting with Graham (Fourth Amendment
seizures), applying its doctrine more generally in Albright (criminal
protections in the Bill of Rights), and then analogizing in Armendariz
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1410
(9th Cir. 1989) (allowing a substantive due process claim despite a takings claim being
unrie), overruled by Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1311.
3 See Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1324 ("Because the conduct that the plaintiffs allege is
the type of government action that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments regulate, Gra-
ham precludes their substantive due process claims."). The merit of any potential sub-
stantive due process claim is irrelevant. Id. at 1326.
74 Id. at 1322-24.
75 Armendariz's takings claim failed because it was not ripe. Id. at 1325 n.10.
Moreover, a takings claim need not even be brought in the first place for a substantive
due process claim to be disallowed. See, e.g., Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1129
(9th Cir. 1997) ("[The plaintiffs] present[ed] essentially a takings claim under the
claim of substantive due process . . . . [They] cannot sidestep Armendariz by re-
characterizing their claim as lying solely in substantive due process.").
76 Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1325.
77 See, e.g., Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 1999) (concern-
ing spot zoning); Macri, 126 F.3d at 1127 (concerning a "rule of thumb" limit on de-
velopment characterized as "arbitrary and capricious" by the county court).
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(to Fifth Amendment takings), the Ninth Circuit has prohibited all
substantive due process claims in land development cases in federal
courts west of the Rockies.
The First Circuit has followed the lead of the Ninth. Although it
previously had allowed substantive due process claims, 8 the First Cir-
cuit reversed itself in 1998, noting that "the legal terrain has shifted
considerably in the intervening years [since Smithfield in 1990] ."'9
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit probably considers substantive due
process claims to be subsumed into the Takings Clause. 0 Indeed,
Miller preceded Armendariz by five years. However, the Tenth Circuit
has seemed tentative recently in its adherence to the Graham doctrine
for takings, casting doubt upon its earlier holdings.8'
C. Circuits Applying the Graham Doctrine to SDP Takings Claims,
but Not Arbitrary and Capricious SDP Claims
Two circuits distinguish between SDP takings claims, which they
consider forbidden by (or subsumed into) the Takings Clause, and
arbitrary and capricious SDP claims, which they permit.
The Eleventh Circuit makes this distinction explicitly. In Bicker-
78 See, e.g., Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 349-50 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[Wle have never
announced a rule precluding district courts from finding substantive due process viola-
tions by land use planning officials in every conceivable case."); Smithfield Concerned
Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1990)
(recognizing a substantive due process challenge to a zoning ordinance but finding no
violation); Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1983) (af-
firming a substantive due process judgment for a developer whose land was earmarked
for condemnation, but not yet condemned after fourteen years).
79 S. County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 835 n.2
(1st Cir. 1998).
80 See Bateman v. City of W. Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
due process and equal protection claims unripe because the takings claim into which
they were "subsume[d]" was unripe); Miller v. Campbell County, 945 F.2d 348, 352-53
(10th Cir. 1991) (citing Graham for the proposition that a substantive due process
claim is not permitted because it is "subsumed" in the Takings Clause, but seeming to
limit that holding to the facts of the case).
81 See Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2000) (rely-
ing upon nearly twenty-five-year-old precedent and a detailed analysis of the plaintiffs
precise property interest to defeat a substantive due process claim, without mention of
either Bateman or Miller).
82 See Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 613-14 (11th Cir.
1997) (stating that "[t]he notion of due process as an independent ground [for regu-
latory takings claims] has now been refuted," but also that "[a] landowner's vested
rights created by state law may indeed constitute property subject to the arbitrary and
capricious substantive due process protections under the federal Constitution"); Bick-
erstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, Ga., 89 F.3d 1481, 1490 & n.16 (11th Cir.
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staff a brick manufacturer sought to have its land, initially zoned for
agriculture, rezoned to allow a quarry. The county not only denied
the manufacturer's request, but even took the opportunity to rezone
the land for residential use only. Because the parcel was landlocked,
this rendered it economically worthless. The court held that, because
the issue was whether the rezoning was a valid exercise of the county's
police powers, and because "the scope of 'public use' under the Tak-
ings Clause and the scope of 'police power' under the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause are the same,
8 3 Bickerstaff's
due process claim was merely an SDP takings claim and hence sub-
sumed into the Fifth Amendment.
In John Corp. v. City of Houston, the Fifth Circuit implicitly drew the
84
same distinction as the Eleventh. John Corporation alleged that it
wanted to rehabilitate fifty-three apartment buildings previously
scheduled for demolition in Houston."' After discussing its plans with
the city and posting a seventy-thousand-dollar bond, John began the• 86
renovations. However, the city evidently had a change of heart: it
evicted all of John's tenants, went out of its way to thwart repair ef-
forts, and then demolished many of the buildings.
87
The court decided that John's takings claim did not necessarily
forbid its substantive due process claim. "Instead, a careful analysis
must be undertaken to assess the extent to which a plaintiff's substan-
tive due process claim rests on protections that are also afforded by
the Takings Clause . . . ."8 John's "careful analysis" is a test the vague-
ness of which is perhaps exceeded only by the "substantive" standard
of substantive due process itself. It seems to prohibit SDP takings
claims yet allow some sort of arbitrary and capricious SDP claims.
The Fifth Circuit failed to clarify the John test in Simi Investment Co.
89
v. Harris County, Texas. Simi owned land near the Houston Astro-
dome that was separated from the street by a five foot wide, three
thousand foot long county "park." The adjacent landowner, who was
1996) (holding that "Bickerstaffs Takings Clause claim subsumes its substantive due
process claim" because Bickerstaff challenged the public purpose of the zoning deci-
sion, but noting that an arbitrary and capricious SDP claim "is not foreclosed by the
Takings Clause").
83 Bickerstaff, 89 F.3d at 1490.
84 214 F.3d 573, 585 (5th Cir. 2000).
85 Id. at 575.
86 Id.
87 Id.
8 Id. at 583.
89 236 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2000).
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a county official, allegedly caused Simi to be denied the right to cross
the five foot wide "park" so Simi could not interfere with the official's
business-operating the stadium. Simi won its arbitrary and capri-
cious SDP claim after a "careful analysis," which the court only clari-
fied by stating that "when a state interferes with property interests, a
substantive due process claim may survive a takings analysis."9°
These two circuits' interpretation is, in the end, little different
from the circuits that do not restrict substantive due process claims. If
the takings claim is ripe, then any violation of substantive due process
necessarily will be a taking91 and hence prohibited as an SDP takings
claim. But when the substantive due process claim is ripe and the tak-
ings claim is not,92 an arbitrary and capricious SDP claim is possible.
This implies that the due process claim will only lie if the plaintiff has
not sought compensation. This was the exact situation in Simi.
D. Circuits Imposing Heightened Ripeness Requirements for Substantive Due
Process Claims in Lieu of the Graham Doctrine
Two circuits have refused to apply the Graham doctrine as the
Ninth Circuit did in Armendariz: the D.C. Circuit explicitly 3 and the
Sixth Circuit implicitly.94 However, perhaps sympathetic to the result
in Armendariz, each has disqualified substantive due process claims on
another ground-that they did not meet the very same strict ripeness
requirements that are required of regulatory takings. In doing so, the
primary reason for bringing a substantive due process claim is elimi-
nated. Thus, while these circuits do not uphold Armendariz and Gra-
ham in form, they do so in substance.
In Montgomery, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with its prior precedent
90 Id. at 249.
91 Supra text accompanying note 24.
92 See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining that takings claims must satisfy two prongs-
finality and compensation-to be ripe, while arbitrary and capricious SDP claims
merely need to satisfy the finality prong).
93 See Tri County Indus., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("But in this circuit at least.... the requirements of the [T]akings [C] lause can-
not be said to exhaust the Fifth Amendment's substantive protection of property rights
from government imposition.").
94 Montgomery v. Carter County, Tenn., 226 F.3d 758, 768-70 (6th Cir. 2000) (ac-
knowledging Armendariz but refusing to rely upon it); cf Choate's Air Conditioning &
Heating, Inc. v. Light, Gas & Water Div., No. 00-5399, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 14777, at
*17-20 (6th Cir. June 22, 2001) (implying in dicta that an arbitrary and capricious SDP
claim might be allowed).
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allowing most substantive due process claims.
9 It signaled that it
would no longer accept the use of substantive due process claims be-
fore the ripeness requirements of a takings claim are met.
The District of Columbia Circuit is not normally a hotbed of land
development litigation, but it considered the issue in Tri County Indus-
tries, Inc. v. District of Columbia.
97 There, the plaintiff obtained all the
building permits and licenses required to convert an empty warehouse
in Washington and to operate it as a hazardous materials decontami-
nation facility.9 But as public opposition to the facility grew, the Dis-
trict responded by suspending both Tri County's building permit and•• 99
its air quality permit.
Although Tri County's takings claim against the District was not
ripe because it had never sought just compensation, the court inde-
pendently considered Tri County's substantive due process claim.
The court went on, however, to hold that virtually the same ripeness
requirement also applies to substantive due process claims.
°° Unlike
the Sixth Circuit, which offered no basis whatsoever for its substantive
due process ripeness requirement, the D.C. Circuit purported to find
its ripeness requirement implicitly or explicitly in the substantive con-
tent of the Due Process Clause.
Imposing a similar ripeness requirement upon both substantive
due process and regulatory takings is attractive because it eliminates
the primary motivation for bringing a substantive due process claims
as opposed to takings claims. But therein lies the fatal flaw with the
Sixth and D.C. Circuits' formulation, at least with regard to arbitrary
95 Specifically, dicta in Montgomery disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's earlier didac-
tic opinion in Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1992), which
called the existence of an unlawful zoning action the only ripeness requirement for a
substantive due process claim. Montgomery, 226 F.3d at 768-70. Ironically, the Pearson
court had criticized the district court below for the precise holding the appellate court
itself adopted in Montgomery just eight years later. See Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1215 ("By
holding that the taking theory subsumes all other theories in zoning cases, the trial
court in the instant case would impose these stringent ripeness requirements on all
zoning cases.").
96 Montgomery, however, leaves open the possibility of a substantive due process
claim if a takings claim is also ripe. 226 F.3d at 769-70 ("[S] ubstantive due process ...
may not be used in order to mount an end run around the ripeness requirements [for
takings claims]."); see also Choate's, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 14777, at *20-21 (requiring
an inverse condemnation suit before any constitutional violation is ripe).
97 104 F.3d at 459-60.
98 Id. at 45 7.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 459-60.
101 Id.
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and capricious SDP claims: unlike takings doctrine, there is simply no
basis for these circuits' odd requirement that a plaintiff must seek a
compensation remedy before bringing substantive due process
102claim. The Constitution forbids violations of due process regardless
of whether they are compensated or not and there is no compensa-
tion ripeness requirement to bring substantive due process claims for
any liberty interest that may be infringed. Forbidding substantive due
process claims is the correct result, but using ripeness requirements is
the wrong way to get there for arbitrary and capricious SDP claims.
E. Circuits Ignoring the Graham Doctrine
While Armendariz has gained adherents in the circuit courts of ap-
peals in recent years, four circuits have not restricted substantive due
process claims in land development rights cases. These circuits have
yet to address Armendariz and the Graham doctrine. They include the
Second,0 3 Third,0 4 Fourth,' 5 and Eighth'0 6 Circuits. Because these
102 The D.C. and Sixth Circuits' ripeness requirement is correct for SDP takings
claims if one assumes that those claims are legitimate to begin with.
103 See Lisa's Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1999)
(allowing a substantive due process claim, but holding that it failed); Vill. Pond, Inc. v.
Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 377-79 (2d Cir. 1995) (permitting a builder's substantive
due process challenge to the town's decision not to allow two condominiums to be oc-
cupied unless the builder sold them to the town); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d
81, 85 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that prohibiting the occupancy of a new home which
meets the building code, when the building official has no discretion beyond that is-
sue, is a deprivation of property without due process).
104 The Third Circuit is the most liberal in the country in allowing substantive due
process claims for developers. See Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118,
120-22, 125 (3d Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff's substantive due process
challenge to the denial of its application for subdivision approval); Blanche Rd. Corp.
v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 254 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing judgment as a mat-
ter of law for the government); DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 593
(3d Cir. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for the government); Bello v. Walker,
840 F.2d 1124, 1128 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); cf Herr v. Pequea Township, 274 F.3d 109,
127 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (Garth,J., dissenting) (recognizing that Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266 (1994), may invalidate a claim of"a malicious use of civil process claim in vio-
lation of [the] 14th Amendment," but nevertheless arguing that a substantive due pro-
cess claim still exists).
105 See Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal,
Va., 135 F.3d 275, 287-88 (4th Cir. 1998) (allowing a substantive due process claim, but
holding that it failed); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th
Cir. 1995) (same); Marks v. City of Chesapeake, Va., 883 F.2d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that withholding a permit for a palm reading business for religious reasons is
arbitrary and capricious and violates due process).
106 0 See Rozman v. City of Columbia Heights, 268 F.3d 588, 592-93 (8th Cir. 2001)
(allowing a substantive due process claim, but holding that it failed); Bituminous Ma-
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circuits fail to apply the Graham doctrine, "[w]e may conclude that
these courts view[] the substantive due process claims before them as
asserting rights not protected by the Takings 
Clause."10 7
F. The Seventh Circuit's Rejection of Substantive Due Process
in Land Development Cases
Substantive due process for land development regulation claims is
simply a non-starter in the Seventh Circuit. Judge Frank Easterbrook's
opinion in Gosnell v. City of Troy, Illinois, refers to substantive due pro-
cess as an "oxymoron" and takes pains to remind us that "[e] conomic
substantive due process is not just embattled; it has been van-
quished. 10 8 Thus, in federal court in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin,
land development regulation simply cannot be invalidated with a sub-
stantive due process claim; instead, the remedy is compensation
through a takings claim."' "A municipality may bring ... develop-
ment to a halt for strong reasons or weak reasons. If the latter, the
municipality has to pay for the privilege. But act it may. Businesses
must make their arguments under the [T]akings [C] lause.... .""
0
But even the Seventh Circuit now hedges its bet. In Forseth v. Vil-
lage of Sussex, the court "recognized the potential for a plaintiff to
maintain a substantive due process claim in the context of land use
decisions." 1
Is Judge Easterbrook the only one who remembers that Lochner
terials, Inc. v. Rice County, Minn., 126 F.3d 1068, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); Al-
exander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding a 14th
Amendment violation in substantially restricting access to adult bookstores through a
zoning ordinance that would have put seven to nine of the ten adult bookstores in the
city out of business).
107 John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 2000).
108 59 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995). Procedural due process is likewise "a redun-
dancy." Id. Judge Easterbrook does, however, recognize two legitimate theories that
share a similar foundation with economic substantive due process: the protection of
fundamental liberty interests and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states.
Id. at 657-58.
109 Seeking compensation for an alleged taking not acknowledged by the govern-
ment is referred to as "inverse condemnation." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
258 n.2 (1980).
110 Gosne4 59 F.3d at 657 (citations omitted); see also McKenzie v. City of Chicago,
118 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) ("If it is willing to pay the piper,
Chicago may call the tune free from any objection based on 'substantive due proc-
ess.').
1 199 F.3d 363, 368-69 (7th Cir. 2000) (listing cases contrary to Gosnell).
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was "vanquished"?' 12 Perhaps not. But as the spilled ink on this topic
surely suggests, later generations have forgotten the sacrifices of the
generation that went to war against economic substantive due process.
III. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE GRAHAM DOCTRINE ON CHALLENGES
TO LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
If the Graham doctrine extends to the Takings Clause, as the
Ninth Circuit held in Armendariz, then substantive due process claims
will be unavailable to developer plaintiffs, who will have to allege regu-
latory takings instead. The effect of using Graham in this way is best
understood by examining the differences between substantive due
process claims and regulatory takings claims, including the different
claims' effects on plaintiffs' litigation strategies and chances for suc-
113cess.
These differences may be grouped into three loosely defined
categories-procedural, substantive, and remedial. Among the pro-
cedural differences, the most significant is ripeness, which makes get-
ting into federal court much more difficult for takings plaintiffs. Sub-
stantive differences, however, make regulatory takings claims
(theoretically) easier to win because of the somewhat heightened level
of means-ends scrutiny employed. Finally, although the available
remedies vary, the differences are smaller than they may first appear.
A. Procedural Differences
The procedural differences between takings and substantive due
process claims may significantly affect the choice of tactics employed
by a plaintiff. Ripeness is a major hurdle for a would-be takings plain-
tiff attempting to state a claim; hence, due process claims are often
faster and less expensive to make. Preemption, the availability of a
jury trial, and forum differences may also be of concern.
1. Ripeness
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
112 Lochner has never been formally overruled. But cf. supra note 3 (quoting
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963), which indicates the Supreme Court's
opinion that the Lochner doctrine has been "discarded").
113 See Karena C. Anderson, Comment, Strategic Litigating in Land Use Cases: Del
Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 465 (1998) (considering litigants'
reasons for pursuing a substantive due process claim or a takings claim or both).
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Johnson City1 4 sets forth the two-pronged federal ripeness requirement
for regulatory takings."1 5 The first is a finality prong: "a claim that the
application of government regulations effects a taking of a property
interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with imple-
menting the regulations [under which the property was "taken"] has
reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations
to the property at issue." 6 The finality prong serves several purposes,
including developing of a factual record and preventing garden vari-
ety zoning conflicts from becoming federal cases.'17 How far a devel-
oper must go is not precisely stated, but it seems clear that in zoning
cases, both an initial application and a variance application must be
denied. 8 Multiple applications are also required to perfect a regula-
tory takings claim."9 Generally, the finality prong is the easier of the
two ripeness prongs for a plaintiff to meet; the time and cost involved
in submitting zoning applications are often low compared to an in-
verse condemnation suit. However, revised applications to develop-
ment plans can nevertheless involve costly architectural, engineering,
and legal fees.
Second is a compensation prong. A takings claim against a state
also requires the plaintiff to have unsuccessfully sought just compen-
sation through a procedure established by the state (typically, an in-
verse condemnation suit). 2 0 The Fifth Amendment is not violated by
a mere taking; a taking must be uncompensated before a federal con-
114 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
1 The Williamson County ripeness doctrine does not apply to the extent a plaintiff
claims property was taken for a private use. See Montgomery v. Carter County, Tenn.,
226 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the weight of authority supports
this result). Hence, substantive due process claims would not enjoy this major advan-
tage over "private takings" claims. Cf Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, Ga.,
89 F.3d 1481, 1490 & n.16 (Ilth Cir. 1996) (holding that a private takings claim sub-
sumed an SDP takings claim).
16 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.
117 Anderson, supra note 113, at 471; see also Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby
Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting the rationale for the finality
pron in zoning cases).
118Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 187-88; see also Mendel, supra note 16, at 497-98
(explaining the different interpretations taken by the circuit courts of appeals when
applying the ripeness doctrine to substantive due process).
19 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978) (indi-
cating that rejection of two plans for alterations to plaintiffs property did not mean
that the city would deny all plans).
120 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95. Similarly, takings claims against the fed-
eral government must meet the requirements of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1994). 473 U.S. at 195.
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stitutional claim is ripe. The compensation prong reflects the view
that a plaintiff must give the state the opportunity to identify and
compensate a regulatory taking before literally making a federal case
out of the situation. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the practical effect of
the compensation prong is often to require lengthy and expensive
litigation before a federal takings claim can be heard.
The ripeness of an arbitrary and capricious SDP claim is also sub-
ject to the finality prong of Williamson County.2 ' However, the more
onerous compensation prong is not required."' Because the Consti-
tution does not give government the option of merely compensating
violations of due process (unlike takings), there is generally no need
to seek compensation through state-mandated procedures before an
arbitrary and capricious SDP claim is ripe. 2' This is the great advan-
tage of a due process claim, and it is often the motivation behind de-
velopers' substantive due process claims. Hence, in jurisdictions
where the Graham doctrine is used to prohibit substantive due process
claims, developers find it more difficult to ever get into federal court.
2. Preclusion
If a plaintiff in ajurisdiction allowing both types of claims chooses
only to pursue a takings claim, she may lose any opportunity for a sub-
stantive due process claim that she might have had. The inverse con-
demnation litigation required of federal takings claims by the com-
pensation prong of Williamson County may preclude any subsequent
substantive due process claim. 24 Most state courts try the constitu-
121 473 U.S. at 199. Although the circuit courts of appeals have interpreted the
precise definition of what constitutes a final decision differently, Mendel, supra note
16, at 497-98; Anderson, supra note 113, at 472-73, there is no evidence that the criteria
are any different for takings and substantive due process claims. See Forseth v. Vill. of
Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368-70 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting prior Seventh Circuit precedent
that indicated a difference).
122 But see supra Part II.D (noting that two circuits impose the same ripeness re-
quirements upon substantive due process claims as on takings claims).
123 But see Anderson, supra note 113, at 473 & n.32 (noting First Circuit cases
where a state inverse condemnation suit was required to be resolved before a substan-
tive due process claim was ripe). These cases, however, were decided before the First
Circuit adopted the Graham doctrine.
124 Also, a federal takings claim itself may be precluded by the same state inverse
condemnation suit. See generally Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings
Claims to State Courts: The Federal Courts' Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Wil-
liamson County, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 14 (1999) ("Since the legal and factual issues in
the state and federal takings cases are often similar, if not identical, the plaintiff who
files first in state court is usually precluded from litigating a federal takings claim in
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tional issues in the same proceeding, 12 5 making any substantive due• • 126
process claim subject to claim preclusion. Even if such a claim can
be preserved, the issues of fact involved are very similar,127 raising the
possibility of issue preclusion of a later due process claim.1
28
Therefore, if Graham does not preclude a substantive due process
claim altogether, a plaintiff faces three choices. First, she may pursue
both inverse condemnation and substantive due process claims to-
gether in state court, which is often an undesirable forum for the due
process claim. Second, she may pursue only the inverse condemna-
tion claim in state court, and take her chances on the delay and po-
tential preclusion of a subsequent substantive due process claim in
federal court. Third, she may put off the inverse condemnation claim
(or litigate it in a parallel proceeding) while pursuing a substantive
due process claim in federal court, where it may elicit a better recep-
tion. The third alternative is often the most attractive to a developer
plaintiff, although it may result in duplicative litigation.
3. Other Procedural Differences
The right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment may be
different for substantive due process claims and takings claims, de-r, 129
pending upon the forum. Substantive due process claims are gen-
erally decided without a jury1 30 Similarly, takings liability was histori-
cally reserved for a judge, while the amount of compensation was
decided by a jury. Del Monte Dunes liberalized this rule of thumb.
131
Now, for claims that all economically viable use has been taken, a jury
may decide liability. In addition, some fact-intensive claims that a tak-
federal court.").
125 Stuart Minor Benjamin, Note, The Applicability ofJust Compensation to Substantive
Due Process Claims, 100 YALE L.J. 2667, 2676 n.52 (1991).
126 Anderson, supra note 113, at 476.
See supra Part I.A.2 (explaining that both claims involve a means-ends analysis).
128 See Anderson, supra note 113, at 474 ("[A] landowner plaintiff who particularly
desires a federal forum for her claim may be limited to a substantive due process the-
ory of recovery.").
129 The Seventh Amendment's right to ajury trial does not apply to suits brought
against the federal government, suits brought in state court (including inverse con-
demnation suits), or suits seeking only injunctive relief. See City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 719 (1999) (citing takings cases).
130 See id. at 753 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Substantive due process claims are, of
course, routinely reserved without question for the court.").
131 See id. at 711-22 (recognizing that traditional judge and jury roles are not easily
demarcated in regulatory takings cases).
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The availability of a substantive due process claim may affect the
choice of forum. For example, while Armendariz is binding upon fed-
eral courts in the state of Washington, it is not binding upon state
courts in Washington. Plaintiffs in the State of Washington who wish
to bring substantive due process claims undoubtedly would prefer to
bring their federal claims in state court.
133
B. Substantive Differences
"While Fifth Amendment takings law often carries labels such as
confused and complex, one doctrinal mess that goes beyond those
terms into the realm of the truly maddening is the jumbled distinction
between Fifth Amendment takings claims and Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process claims." 13 4 The difference between the
two claims is best illustrated in examining situations where only a tak-
ing occurs (which is not a violation of due process) and situations
where only a violation of substantive due process occurs (which is not
a taking). SDP takings claims need not be considered because they
allege elements identical to regulatory takings claims; only arbitrary
and capricious SDP claims need be examined.
1. Takings That Do Not Violate Substantive Due Process
Where a regulatory taking occurs that is not a violation of substan-
tive due process, there must be some substantive element for the tak-
ing that is more stringent than, or not present in, a due process analy-
sis. Examples include physical occupations, losses of all economic
value, and certain exactions.' 35 Most significantly, they also include
the "substantial relationship" means-ends analysis of Agins, which Jus-
tice Scalia has insisted is stricter than the "rational basis review" gen-
erally afforded substantive due process claims.
136
Regarding the "means" portion of the two types of means-ends
132 See id. at 720-21 (recognizing that questions of whether land-use decisions ad-
vance the public interest are largely fact-bound and are properly addressed to ajury).
133 See, e.g., Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1993) (illustrating a successful
substantive due process claim made in state court that would have been dismissed had
it been brought in federal court after Armendariz).
134 Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 766.
135 See supra Part I.B (outlining takings doctrine).
136 Supra note 38 and accompanying text. But see Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (noting "the generous Euclid test").
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analyses, two types of claims seem to fall into Justice Scalia's theoreti-
cal gap between the different levels of scrutiny. First, the terms "ra-
tional" and "substantial" infer a difference of degree within which at
least some government regulation could be rationally related (satisfy-
ing substantive due process) yet not substantially related (hence a tak-
ing) to the government purpose. However, "the Court's precedents
have not elaborated on the exact type of connection between a regu-
lation and a state interest that is necessary to constitute a 'substantial
relation,' let alone defined precisely the difference between the sub-
stantial relation test and rationality review.""' In practice, the number
of claims falling between the two levels of scrutiny is vanishingly small.
Conceptually, however, the takings test presumably does not per-
mit the merely conceivable basis for government regulation that "ra-
tional basis review" allows for substantive due process; it appears to
require that the government actually have a substantial relationship in
mind while regulating. If so, then regulation actually motivated by
bad faith (for example, personal gain of the regulator or dislike of the
landowner) or considerations other than the merits would appear to
be a taking, while such regulation is not usually a due process problem
where some other legitimate pretext can 
be found.
Regarding the "ends" analysis, it is not at all clear that there is any
difference between the takings test and the substantive due process
test. The scope of legitimate ends for the purpose of substantive due
process has been held identical to the "public use" requirement of
traditional takings analysis,13 9 and the Supreme Court has not indi-
cated that the ends in an Agins means-ends analysis are any different
from the ends in more traditional takings jurisprudence.
Unlike due process claims, takings claims have no threshold "pro-
tected property interest" requirement. Because a difficult-to-meet en-
titlement test is often used to define the protected property interest,
takings claims may be, substantively, easier to win. This is particularly
true where discretionary use permitting and zoning variances are
commonplace. However, takings claims have their own significant
threshold barrier in Williamson County's compensation prong for ripe-
137 S. County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 836
n.3 (lst Cir. 1998).
138 But see supra note 21 (discussing the Third Circuit's unique interpretation of
substantive due process).
139 Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, Ga., 89 F.3d 1481, 1490 (11th Cir.
1996) (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)).
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140
ness. Hence, these threshold tests may not, in the end, favor either
type of claim.
2. Substantive Due Process Violations That Are Not Takings
The converse, where due process affords a landowner greater sub-
stantive protection than does takings, is difficult to imagine. Such a
case requires that substantive due process impose a more stringent
test upon a regulation than does the Takings Clause.
Arbitrary and capricious SDP claims require a showing of arbitrary
and/or capricious government action. However, this test is not in-
dependent of the means-ends analysis; it is merely another expression
of rational basis review.1 42 As such, it imposes no conditions beyond
this minimal means-ends test, and is therefore less stringent than the
Agins "substantial relationship" test. Hence, it appears that takings law
always provides a landowner at least as much, and sometimes more,
substantive protection against confiscatory regulation as does substan-
tive due process.143
C. Remedial Differences
At first glance, the remedies provided by the Takings Clause and
by the Due Process Clause seem fundamentally different. Regulation
that rises to the level of a taking is allowed by the Constitution; the
Fifth Amendment merely requires that it be compensated. 44 In con-
trast, the Fourteenth Amendment absolutely prohibits a regulation
that deprives one of property without due process. "The remedy for a
regulation that goes too far, under the due process theory, is not 'just
compensation,' but invalidation of the regulation, and if authorized
140 The entitlement test serves as a threshold barrier for substantive due process
claims, while ripeness requirements serve as a threshold barrier for takings claims.
Simply because one may be considered "substantive" and the other "procedural" does
not alter the gatekeeping effects of each.
141 Supranote 21.
142 Cf Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) ("[I]t must be
said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare."). The caselaw uses the tests interchangeably.
However, at least one case has gone the other way. See Guimont v. Clarke, 854
P.2d 1, 16-17 (Wash. 1993) (holding that a violation of substantive due process, but not
a taking, occurred when mobile home park owners were required by state statute to
pay park residents forced to relocate when the owners closed their parks).
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194 (1985).
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and appropriate, actual damages." 45
In practice, however, the distinction between the two remedies is
less important than it might appear. First, monetary damages are of-
ten sought by substantive due process plaintiffs, like just compensa-
tion is sought by inverse condemnation (takings) plaintiffs. When
money is the plaintiffs remedy of choice, however, there is no reason
why the two causes of action need result in significantly different
awards. 46 Just compensation is, theoretically, the fair market value of
the property taken. 47
The damages available under substantive due process initially
seem to have the potential to go far beyond fair market value to in-
clude recovery of costs incurred as a result of the improper govern-
ment action and missed opportunity costs or profits. 4 " Opportunity
costs and profits, however, are merely speculative to the extent they
are not reflected in the fair market value of the property.1 49 Moreover,
a successful substantive due process claim that recovers incurred costs
as damages almost certainly is based upon a violation of state law (for
example, a local zoning ordinance which is a violation of the state
zoning enabling act), and the same damages for incurred costs may be
145 Id. at 197.
146 See Benjamin, supra note 125, at 2670 ("[T]hough a damages award can differ
in amount from just compensation, it is not clear there will be any significant disparity
in actuality."). City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes illustrates the connection between
takings claims and monetary damages:
Because its statutory action did not accrue until it was denied just compensa-
tion, in a strict sense Del Monte Dunes sought not just compensation per se but
rather damages for the unconstitutional denial of such compensation.... As
its name suggests, then, just compensation is, like ordinary money damages, a
compensatory remedy.
526 U.S. 687, 710 (1999).
147 SeeUnited States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) ("It is the owner's loss...
which is the measure of the value of the property taken [in a takings case]."); see also
Katherine E. Stone & Philip A. Seymour, Regulating the Timing of Development: Takings
Clause and Substantive Due Process Challenges to Growth Control Regulations, 24 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1205, 1207 (1991) (characterizing the remedy available in takings claims as "dam-
ages").
148 Substantive due process suits under § 1983 also afford a plaintiff the possibility
of punitive damages and attorney's fees. Anderson, supra note 113, at 479-83. How-
ever, such awards are rare. But see Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, Tex., 236 F.3d 240,
255 (5th Cir. 2000) (awarding attorney's fees and implying that a successful § 1983
claim predicated on a violation of substantive due process might always be sufficient to
warrant such an award).
149 See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 271 (l1th Cir. 1987)
("[T]he relevant fair market values by definition reflect a market estimation of future
profits....").
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available under the substantive state law involved. Therefore, there
is little reason why the amount awarded a plaintiff in a takings case
should be any different from the amount in a substantive due process
151
case.
Second, although a substantive due process plaintiff may seek to
invalidate the government action, that remedy is also available for a
takings plaintiff.152 If so, both types of plaintiffs would also be eligible
for payment for the period during which the regulation was effective,
the former as "damages" and the latter as compensation for a "tempo-
rary taking."
153
Third, it is not clear that most plaintiffs would necessarily prefer
one remedy over the other if given an option. In fact, many substan-
tive due process plaintiffs seek damages. Moreover, these claims are
generally brought by developers who envision selling or leasing the
property once it is developed. To such a developer, the property is a
fungible investment. If the developer is compensated an amount
equivalent to her profit, a takings remedy would put her (financially)
in the same position as if the regulation were invalidated under sub-
stantive due process. Of course, there are other considerations that
might influence an individual developer to favor one remedy or an-
150 See Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal,
Va., 135 F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[G]overnmental actions that are violative of
state law are properly challenged in state courts which exist, in part, to protect citizens
from abuses of state law. Whether the Town illegally refused to comply with [state law]
is not determinative of whether federal substantive due process has been violated." (ci-
tations omitted)).
151 See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 39, at 708 ("[W]hether one or the other
would provide a larger recovery is difficult to discern in the abstract."). But see Ander-
son, supra note 113, at 480-81 (noting potential reasons for differences between the
two awards). One can easily imagine a developer who had considerable engineering,
design, and legal expenses associated with a project, but who had not begun construc-
tion at the time a confiscatory regulation was imposed. In such a case, the developer
could have potential damages far exceeding the value of the raw land. Yet Del Monte
Dunes seems to include the value of such expenditures in the 'Just compensation"
mandated by the Fifth Amendment. See 526 U.S. at 710 ("[I]n determining just com-
pensation, the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained." (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
152 In a takings claim, however, the government retains the option of invalidating
the regulation, not the plaintiff. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987); see id. ("Once a court determines that a
taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already avail-
able-amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exer-
cise of eminent domain."); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42
(1987) (granting injunctive relief for a taking by invalidating a condition on a building
permit rather than requiring just compensation).
153 First English, 482 U.S. at 318-19.
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other: whether the amount of compensation will indeed equal her
potential profit, the uncertainty of the real estate market, the degree
of opportunity cost and capital investment required to actually de-
velop the property, the value to her reputation of completing a proj-
ect, the relative time required to realize the two types of income, etc.
Occasionally, a plaintiff who is herself the end user of the property
might value the completed development much more so than its mar-
ket value.5  Nevertheless, for the typical plaintiff, there is no overrid-
ing consideration that would cause her to favor being justly compen-
sated over having the regulation invalidated and being permitted to
proceed with development.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS SHOULD NOT LIE IN
LAND DEVELOPMENT CASES
The arguments against the use of substantive due process by land
developers start with this seemingly self-evident lodestar: Lochner's
economic substantive due process doctrine was and continues to be
wrong. The Due Process Clause should not be read substantively, at
least for property rights. But as the continued viability of substantive
due process in land development cases suggests, this idea is perhaps
not so self-evident after all.
155
If the emperor indeed has no clothes-if economic substantive
due process is illegitimate per se-then the Graham doctrine is unnec-
essary. Alas, such may only be the case in the Seventh Circuit.15 6 The
other circuits evidently require more normative reasons.
154 Homeowners might value use of their property beyond its market value, but
they bring takings or due process challenges to government regulation much less often
than developers and commercial property owners. But see Vill. of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (illustrating a homeowner's exaction claim made under
equal protection); Waltz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1995) (illustrating
a homeowner's substantive due process claim). Such suits are also occasionally
brought by commercial landowners who are also the ultimate users of their property.
See, e.g., Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, Ga., 89 F.3d 1481 (11th Cir. 1996)
(illustrating a zoning challenge by a brick manufacturer who wanted to extract a min-
eral found on the zoned property).
155 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 4, at 956-60 (detailing reasons for overcoming ma-
joritarian objections to economic substantive due process).
156 Supra Part II.F.
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A. Federal Courts Should Abstain from Considering Constitutional
Claims by Land Developers
The federal abstention doctrine set out in Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 
15
dictates circumstances under which a federal court with jurisdiction
may refrain from deciding an issue in deference to state courts. Using
Burford abstention,
a federal equity court ... may, in its sound discretion .... refuse to en-
force or protect legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to
the public interest"; for it "is in the public interest that federal courts of
equity should exercise their discretionary power with proper regard for
the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their
domestic policy."
Burford abstention is generally reserved for cases in which a state has
in place a complex administrative regulatory scheme (with state judi-
cial review possible) in order to solve difficult problems that are pri-
marily local in nature. This doctrine recognizes that sovereign states
should be allowed to establish and conduct their own procedures for
solving local problems without the heavy hand of the federal bench.
Indeed, the interest of the states in such issues far outweighs the in-
terests of the federal government. The doctrine also recognizes that
judicial efficiency militates against federal intervention into issues rou-
tinely and competently handled by state regulatory procedures.
Local land use issues are the epitome of cases in which Burford ab-
stention applies.'59 Local land use decisions affect states far more than
the federal government. States have established intricate, multi-
layered administrative and judicial systems for the making and evalua-
tion of such decisions (often including zoning hearings, zoning ap-
peals hearings, variance applications, de novo and appellate judicial
review, and inverse condemnation proceedings). Allowing a disgrun-
tled developer to short-circuit a state's carefully constructed decision-
making mechanism by going to federal court with a substantive due
process claim robs the state of "a sound respect for the independence
157 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
158 Id. at 317-18 (citations omitted).
159 Pomponio v. Fauquier County Bd. of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319, 1327 (4th Cir.
1994) ("[W]e believe that in the usual case federal courts should not leave their in-
delible print on local and state land use and zoning law by entertaining these cases
and, in effect, sitting as a zoning board of appeals."), disposition rev'd by Front Royal &
Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, Va., 135 F.3d 275, 282 (4th
Cir. 1998).
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of state action. '"' ° It is not surprising, therefore, that federal courts
use Burford abstention doctrine for local land use issues, even when
developers' constitutional rights 
are at issue.'
6 '
If there is any single area where the Federal Constitution and fed-
eral judiciary are unwelcome and meddlesome, it is in local land use
and development decisions. Real property is uniquely local in charac-
ter. The effects of its use or development are generally limited geo-
graphically, and its regulation is inherently a local matter.
6 2 Regard-
less of one's view regarding whether developers need constitutional
help or not,6 3 the invocation of the sledgehammer of federal judicial
power is a particularly chilling control on the judgment of communi-
ties that better know local conditions and needs. The specter of the
federal government's involvement in countless local land disputes
takes our federalism beyond the bounds of reason.
6 4 Moreover, the
limited resources of federal courts themselves weighs against substan-
tive due process rights for developers.
6 5
Burford abstention is an equitable power of the federal courts, and
it may not be invoked to dismiss a cause of action by a district court in
a damage action. 66 This is not an impediment to the use of Burford
abstention where damages are sought, however, because the Court in
Quackenbush pointed out that it was probably appropriate to use Bur-
ford to stay (rather than dismiss) federal proceedings until the state
law issues were resolved in state court.
6
6 Thus, even where a devel-
160 Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
161 See, e.g., MacDonald v. Vill. of Northport, Mich., 164 F.3d 964, 969 (6th Cir.
1999) (upholding Burford abstention by a federal district court where landowners
brought a takings claim to enjoin public use of a right-of-way); Pomponio, 21 F.3d at
1328 (upholding Burford abstention for substantive and procedural due process and
equal protection claims).
16FEnvironmental regulation is perhaps a legitimate exception. It is distinguish-
able from other land development regulation because of its potentially widespread im-
plications; it does not involve the kind of local (sometimes parcel-by-parcel) judgments
required of zoning and other local controls.
See, e.g., Stone & Seymour, supra note 147 (concerning constitutional chal-
lenges to growth control through regulation).
ICA See Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[F]ederal courts
should not become zoning boards of appeal to review nonconstitutional land use de-
terminations by the circuit's many local legislative and administrative agencies.").
165 While not all these federal constitutional claims need be made in federal court,
most are.
166 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730-31 (1996) ("Burford might
support a federal court's decision to postpone adjudication of a damages action pend-
ing the resolution by the state courts of a disputed question of state law.").
167 Id. at 731 (dictum); see also Front Royal, 135 F.3d at 282 (stating that the Por-
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oper's substantive due process claim sought damages, a federal court
would be justified in invoking Burford abstention to stay the federal
case until the developer brought and resolved a state inverse con-
demnation suit. Such a scenario is tantamount to dismissing the sub-
stantive due process claim: the delay likely will be too long and ex-
pensive,""' the substantive due process claim may become precluded,
1 69
and the substantive due process claim will be more difficult to prove
than the inverse condemnation claim. 7 ° In effect, this is the approach
taken by the D.C. and Sixth Circuits in imposing a takings-like ripe-
ness requirement on substantive due process claims."' Thus, whether
or not the substantive due process cause of action seeks damages, the
practical effect of Burford abstention is a dismissal of the substantive
due process claim.
Of course, Burford abstention is discretionary on the part of dis-
trict courts; it alone cannot forbid the federal judiciary from consider-
ing substantive due process claims by land developers. 2 Nevertheless,
the use of Burford abstention in zoning and land development cases
illustrates the power of the argument that the federal judiciary has no
place in deciding local land use policy and that economic substantive
due process has no place in land development law.
B. Graham Does Not Allow Substantive Due Process Claims
by Land Developers
Graham is a convenient "hook" from which might be hung the
noose around Lochner's neck, ending the use of economic substantive
due process by land developers. Graham and Albright recognized the
principal that through
the specific guarantees of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights em-
bodied in the first 10 Amendments to the Constitution ... their Framers
sought to restrict the exercise of arbitrary authority by the government
in particular situations. Where a particular Amendment "provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection" against a particular
ponio court should have stayed the action under Burford, not dismissed it).
168 See supra Part III.A.1 (noting the delay and cost of inverse condemnation suits).
69 See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that the resolution of takings claims often
precludes later substantive due process claims).
See supra Part III.B (discussing the more stringent elements of the takings
means-ends analysis).
171 Supra Part II.D.
172 It is also possible for substantive due process claims to be made against federal
land use regulation, in which case Burford abstention (which requires deference to a
state) would not apply.
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sort of government behavior, "that Amendment, not the more general-
ized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing
these claims."'7 3
Thus, the Graham doctrine provides that the specific remedies of the
Bill of Rights are to be preferred over the "backstop" remedy of sub-
stantive due process.
On its face, this plain language seems to apply not just to criminal
protections (as in Graham and Albright), but to the entire Bill of
Rights. There is no reason to suspect that the Framers intended any
different treatment for the Takings Clause; indeed, it is reasonable to
believe that the doctrine is more applicable to takings than to criminal
protections. Liberty interests (the category at stake in Graham and Al-
bright) have received the most protection under substantive due proc-
ess, yet liberty interests were still subject to the Graham doctrine in
those cases. Property interests, which get much less protection under
substantive due process, should therefore be much more susceptible
to Graham.
174
Graham prohibits any claim of substantive due process arising out
of allegations implicating the Fourth Amendment's protections
against the use of excessive force during an arrest or stop. 
Analogiz-
ing to takings, the Graham doctrine must apply not only to SDP tak-
ings claims, which exactly mimic takings claims, but also to arbitrary
and capricious SDP claims, which arise out of the same nucleus of
facts.
We need not worry that courts will use the Graham doctrine to
reach out and invalidate other substantive due process claims in cases
in which they are legitimately made.1
76 For example, in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland,17 substantive due process was correctly applied to the
liberty interest involved (the right to live with one's grandson) despite
the fact that a property interest was also implicated (government re-
strictions on the use of one's home). The scope of Graham in the tak-
'73 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
174 SeeVill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting)
(stating that, had Boraas merely claimed violations of his property interests, without 
an
equal protection claim, an arbitrary zoning ordinance would have been upheld 
be-
cause "[o]ur role is not and should not be to sit as a zoning board of appeals").
175 490 U.S. at 395.
176 But see Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot for Jot" Account of
Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1086, 1101-03 (1998) (expressing 
this worry,
particularly in homeowner takings cases).
177 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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ings context is easily limited to property interests, which are generally
afforded protection by the Takings Clause. Liberty interests like that
in Moore, which are not explicitly protected in the Bill of Rights, are
not implicated by the Graham doctrine. Moreover, cases in which the
decision maker acts unfairly toward a developer are better viewed as
legitimate (i.e., procedural) due process cases rather than as arising
under substantive due process.
Similarly, we need not worry that the scope of takings cases to
which the Graham doctrine applies is too vague. The means-ends
test for arbitrary and capricious SDP claims varies from the Agins test
for a taking only in degree, not in character, so it is clear when Gra-
ham applies-whenever substantive due process is invoked to protect a
real property interest.
179
Nor will Graham reach out and eliminate equal protection."10 Fa-
cially, the Graham doctrine applies to substantive due process only.
Perhaps equal protection is vague, but the Graham doctrine is about
eliminating unenumerated constitutional rights, not merely vague ones.
C. Addressing the Doctrinal Critics
A frequent criticism of the Graham doctrine is the idea expressed
in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property that where "the seizure
of property implicates two 'explicit textual source [s] of constitutional
protection,' . . . [t]he proper question is not which Amendment con-
trols but whether either Amendment is violated." 1" However, James
Daniel Good was referring to Fourth and Fifth Amendment seizures-
substantive due process is hardly an "explicit textual source" of any-
178 But see Massaro, supra note 176, at 1104-05 (expressing this worry).
179 Cf County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (holding that Gra-
ham does not foreclose a substantive due process claim when the Fourth Amendment
is not implicated).
180 But see Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reap-
praisal, 51 ALA. L. REv. 977, 1004 (2000) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause is
just as open-ended as the Due Process Clause and so may be equally susceptible to the
Graham doctrine); Massaro, supra note 176, at 1100-02 (discussing the possible prob-
lems with Graham separating equal protection concerns from Takings Clause issues in
housing code situations).
181 510 U.S. 43, 50 (1993) (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 70
(1992)); see also Soldal, 506 U.S. at 70-71 (noting that "Graham does not bar resort.., to
the Fourth Amendment's specific protection for 'houses, papers, and effects' rather
than the general protection of property in the Due Process Clause"); Simi Inv. Co. v.
Harris County, Tex., 236 F.3d 240, 248-49 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the idea that the
applicability of one constitutional amendment preempts the guarantees of another);
Eagle, supra note 180, at 1004-05 (noting that "a litigant can claim rights under multi-
ple constitutional provisions" underJames Daniel Good).
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ubstantive due process is hardly an "explicit textual source" of any-
thing. 82 James Daniel Good is limited on its face to "the seizure of
property" in criminal cases, whereas Albright extends the Graham doc-
trine to the Bill of Rights generally.
It has been proposed that the Takings Clause is the better rubric
to challenge the burden placed upon an individual property owner by
a regulation justified by a legitimate public purpose, and that substan-
tive due process is the better rubric to challenge the public purpose
itself 18 3 Thus, goes the argument, the two claims serve different func-
tions and should coexist as independent causes of action. This argu-
ment, however, ignores the fact that the Takings Clause already in-
cludes a "public use" requirement. Although "public use" is a very low
standard, it remains akin to the "legitimate governmental purpose"
embodied in substantive due process.1 8 4 There is no substantive rea-
son why government regulation needs to be measured against such an
ends test in two separate contexts.
Others contend that substantive due process is the proper rubric
under which to resolve issues of "private takings."'
85 Since the Fifth
Amendment explicitly addresses only "public purpose" takings and
does not mention "private takings," the argument is made that the lat-
ter are addressed appropriately as questions of substantive due proc-
ess, not takings. However, there are two distinct flaws in such an ar-
gument. First, it does not explain under what rubric private takings
were prohibited before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in
182 Indeed, Albright draws a sharp distinction between "'an explicit textual source
of constitutional protection"' and substantive due process. 510 U.S. at 273 (quoting
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).
183 See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 39, at 719 ("Where ... the weight and sig-
nificance of the governmental purpose is a relevant factor, the burden imposed by a
government regulation should be subject to constitutional challenge, if at all, under
the Due Process Clause.").
184 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) ("The 'public use'
requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.");
Stone & Seymour, supra note 147, at 1230 ("While regulations which fail to further any
legitimate public purpose may well violate the constitution, it cannot logically be said
that such regulations take property for the public benefit."); Summers, supra note 39,
at 862 ("[The] public use requirement currently employed by the Court fails to serve
any function that is not already satisfied by due process.").
185 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 113, at 514 n.256 (noting that private takings
"may be more appropriately treated under a substantive due process, rather than a just
compensation, analysis"). A "private taking" is the government's confiscation of pri-
vate property (or excessive regulation of its use) not for a public purpose, but rather
for the benefit of another private entity.
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1868.186 Second, such an interpretation would lead to illogical and
grossly unfair results. Imagine legislation requiring A, a wealthy
homeowner, to give her home to B, a welfare recipient. If this argu-
ment prevailed, A could not demand compensation because the legis-
lation would not be subject to the Takings Clause because it is a pri-
vate taking. Nor could A invalidate the legislation on substantive due
process grounds, since it is rationally related to a conceivably legiti-
mate governmental purpose (helping the poor). The inescapable re-
sult is absurd.
Substantive due process proponents claim that improperly moti-
vated government actions (e.g., maliciously targeted at individuals or
designed to benefit the decision maker personally) are not necessarily
takings and ought to be prohibited through substantive due process.'87
This argument confuses substantive and procedural due process."'
D. A World Without Substantive Due Process Rights for Land Developers
The elimination of substantive due process rights would not be
the bane of developers. Substantively, developers are better off with
takings claims than with substantive due process claims. s9 The minor
differences in available remedies are generally not a significant is-190
sue. Procedurally, the option of a jury trial, the wider choice of
available fora, and the lack of preemption worries favor making a tak-
ings claim over making a substantive due process claim.
Nevertheless, for many developer plaintiffs, one factor overwhelms
these advantages: a substantive due process claim is not subjected to
the compensation prong of the Williamson County ripeness doctrine in
most federal courts. 91 However, SDP takings claims should be subject
186 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (disallowing "a law that
takes property away from A and gives it to B").
187 See, e.g., Stone & Seymour, supra note 147, at 1231 & n.171 (citing examples of
malicious action by government against individuals); see also DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing a substantive due process
claim against a decision allegedly influenced by the financial interest of a zoning board
member's son).
188 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (considering the degree of bias per-
mitted a state agency under procedural due process).
189 Supra Part III.B.
190 See supra Part III.C (explaining that the same monetary awards are generally
available, that equitable relief is possible for both claims, and that there is no generally-
applicable reason for a plaintiff to prefer one over the other).
191 But see supra Part II.D (noting that the Sixth and D.C. Circuits require a plain-
tiff to seek just compensation before making her substantive due process claims).
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to both the ripeness prongs of Williamson County.192 An SDP takings
claim alleges that conduct that amounts to a taking must necessarily
be a deprivation of property without due process. If that conduct
does not rise to the level of a taking, then by definition an SDP takings
claim cannot lie. A claim cannot rise to the level of a taking without
meeting Williamson County's two-pronged ripeness test. Hence, the
Williamson County test is also a prerequisite for an SDP takings claim.'93
The advantage of arbitrary and capricious SDP claims over takings
claims in terms of ripeness requirements is significantly offset by the
other procedural and substantive advantages of a takings claim.
Moreover, the mere fact that substantive due process plaintiffs enjoy a
procedural advantage over takings plaintiffs is not by itself necessarily
good policy, as illustrated by Burford abstention doctrine. 1
94
E. Where the Supreme Court May Go
The Supreme Court has been silent on the use of substantive due
process for land development rights and its relationship to regulatory
takings.' 95 It remains justifiably fearful of giving judges the wide dis-
cretion represented by substantive due process. 96 There is circum-
stantial evidence that developers' substantive due process rights are
tenuous at best: the Court has refused to recognize the right, 9' and
the incorporation of a means-ends test into takings doctrine may be a
precursor to the elimination of substantive due process for developers
through the Graham doctrine.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court cast doubt on this circum-
192 If arbitrary and capricious SDP claims are allowed, however, there seems to be
no reason to subject them to the compensation prong. Supra text accompanying notes
122-23.
193 Without recognizing that an SDP takings claim existed, the Williamson County
Court supported this position. "In sum, respondent's claim is premature, whether it is
analyzed as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, or as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment." 473 U.S. at 200.
'94 Supra Part V.A.
195 See supra notes 56-57 (noting specific cases of the Court's reticence).
196 See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ("As a gen-
eral matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchar-
tered area are scarce and open-ended.").
197 See, e.g., supra note 57 (explaining how the Court ignored substantive due pro-
cess arguments in Penn Central); supra text accompanying notes 35-37 (explaining the
Court's disavowal of substantive due process in Euclid and Nectow).
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stantial evidence in deciding Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel. ' Eastern En-
terprises was the former owner of a coal mining business. Eastern
(and the rest of the industry) agreed to provide medical insurance to
its retirees as long as it remained in the coal business, but in 1985 it
sold its coal mining operation. As the industry shrunk and more coal
mines went out of business, the number of retired miners who were
"orphaned" without benefits grew dramatically. Congress sought to
solve the problem by passing the Coal Act,' 99 which spread the burden
of caring for all the "orphaned" miners upon former industry players
such as Eastern Enterprises. Eastern's obligation under the Coal Act
was a staggering fifty to one hundred million dollars.
Eastern Enterprises claimed that the Coal Act was both a taking
and a violation of its substantive due process rights. The First Circuit
considered both arguments, but upheld the Act.00
The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision. ' A plural-
ity of four analyzed the Coal Act under the Takings Clause and found
that it had been applied unconstitutionally to Eastern Enterprises.
The four dissenters analyzed the Act as a substantive due process case
and found it to have passed muster. Justice Kennedy concurred with
the plurality that the Coal Act unconstitutionally burdened Eastern
Enterprises, but he reached his decision using a substantive due proc-
ess analysis."' Hence, although there was a majority of five for the
proposition that the Coal Act was applied unconstitutionally to East-
ern, there was also a majority of five for the proposition that the case
was an issue of substantive due process, not of a taking. In this re-
spect, Justice Kennedy's opinion, which was subscribed to by no other
Justice, may nevertheless represent the majority view.
Although seeming to give a boost to substantive due process, this
type of plurality decision is perhaps best viewed as narrowly applicable
198 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
199 Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act), 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-
9722 (1994).
200 E. Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. E. Enters. v. Ap-
fel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). This was a year before the First Circuit held that substantive
due process claims would not lie when a "garden-variety regulatory takings claim" was
possible. S. County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 835
(1st Cir. 1998).
201 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
202 Id. at 538-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
203 See Eagle, supra note 180, at 988 (likening Justice Kennedy's opinion to Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
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only to its particular facts. 20 4 The facts of Eastern Enterprises, in which
an obligation to pay pecuniary retirement health benefits was at stake,
are easily distinguished from land use regulation cases. Indeed, both
205 2016
Justice Kennedy and the dissenters seem to have based their appli-
cation of substantive due process on the fact that no specific property
interest (like the right to develop a particular lot) was "taken"; in-
stead, the obligation imposed upon Eastern Enterprises was a general
one reaching all the company's property. Therefore, Eastern Enter-
prises is distinguishable from land development cases and is no barrier
to the elimination of substantive due process claims in that context.
Perhaps the Supreme Court has resurrected economic substantive
due process within the Takings Clause. If so, that will be a battle for
another time. At present, there is no need for another source of such
protection for land developers in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Economic substantive due process, long thought extinct, actually
lives on like an endangered species isolated on the island of real
property law. The Graham doctrine, however, affords an opportunity
to extirpate this final species of the Lochner era, yet do so without sig-
nificant harm to the rights of developers. With the incorporation of a
means-ends test into regulatory takings doctrine, economic substan-
tive due process is no longer rationally related to any legitimate legal
purpose.
204 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds ... (quoting
Gregv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Our cases do not support
the plurality's conclusion that the Coal Act takes property.").
2o1 Id. at 554-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution's Takings Clause does
not apply.").
* * * * * *
